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REASON, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
Matthew Steilen 
State University of New York University at Buffalo 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews David Strauss’s recent book, The Living Constitution. The thesis of 
Strauss’s book is that constitutional law is a kind of common law, based largely on 
judicial precedent and commonsense judgments about what works and what is fair. In 
defending this claim, Strauss argues that central constitutional prohibitions of 
discrimination and protections of free speech have a common-law basis and that the 
originalist should consequently reject them. The review disputes this contention. It 
examines Strauss’s account of the common law and argues that it cannot support our First 
Amendment protections of subversive advocacy, as Strauss says it does. The review then 
offers an alternative account of the common law based on the “classical” common-law 
theory associated with Coke and Hale. The latter account does support our protections of 
subversive advocacy but is much less appealing to those distrustful of ambitious and 
large-scale judicial action. 
 
Reason is the life of the law. 
—Edward Coke 
 
                                                 
 I thank reviewer Michael Dorf for his helpful suggestions. 
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In The Living Constitution, David Strauss argues that constitutional law is a kind of 
common law. For Strauss, this means that constitutional law is based on judicial 
precedent as well as broader social and political traditions, shared understandings, and 
judgments about what is fair and what works.1 Our “living Constitution,” says Strauss, is 
this body of constitutional common law, along with the written constitutional text. It is 
“living” in the sense that it changes in response to changes in our world. 
The Living Constitution is an important book, despite being largely adapted from 
Strauss’s earlier work.2 It is aimed at and appears to have succeeded in reaching a wider 
audience than Strauss’s academic publications.3 It arrives at an important time in the 
history of our country, when there is a sense that politically conservative judges have 
become more willing to strike down legislation they view as unconstitutional, 
complicating the long-standing association between judicial activism and the political 
left. And for the most part, The Living Constitution is well written and well argued. 
Strauss undoubtedly succeeds in lending an air of plausibility to the idea of a “living” 
                                                 
1 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010), at 35. 
2 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 846 (2007); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and 
Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
3 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Why Bother with the Constitution?, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010. 
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Constitution. This is a significant accomplishment, given that the term has largely 
functioned as a legal epithet for the past fifteen years. Originalism has been ascendant. 
This review focuses on Strauss’s account of the common law. While considerable 
attention has been directed at the book’s criticisms of originalism, very little attention has 
been paid to its account of the common law, which Strauss styles as the great competitor 
to originalism and its parent theory, legal positivism. Yet there is much to say about 
Strauss’s views on the common law, even from the perspective of one persuaded of the 
merits of common-law constitutionalism. Originalism, Strauss tells us early in the book, 
cannot account for many of our most cherished constitutional protections. It cannot 
account for the First Amendment protections of subversive advocacy, whose contours are 
derived from the line of cases ending in Brandenburg v. Ohio and not from original 
understandings or bare constitutional text. Original understandings are at best unclear and 
at worst would have permitted punishment of subversive advocacy as seditious libel. In 
Strauss’s view, this poses a serious problem for originalism and provides reason to 
embrace the idea of a “living” Constitution. As it turns out, however, there is a problem 
with this story: Strauss cannot justify our protection of subversive advocacy either. The 
common law, as he describes it, is far too weak. 
I will have much more to say about what I mean by “weak,” but here is a first 
approximation of the issue. Strauss is keen to present the common law as a 
“conservative” decision-making method. By “conservative,” I do not mean politically 
conservative but a kind of disposition or attitude that involves caution, moderation, 
humility about one’s own understanding, and a focus on what has worked in experience. 
Some have called this “Burkean” conservatism, after the British statesman Edmund 
4 
Burke, and indeed, Strauss draws heavily on Burke’s views in describing the common 
law. There are good reasons for Strauss to take this approach, not the least of which is 
that he is trying to appeal to those distrustful of ambitious and large-scale judicial action. 
A Burkean common law—cautious, moderate, empirical—should strike these individuals 
as sensible. The problem is that the common law is not that tame. A fair look at its history 
in our own country shows that it has been at times courageous, experimental, and highly 
abstract and theoretical. As I describe below, subversive advocacy protections are case in 
point. 
Moreover, this behavior cannot be attributed to the isolated decisions of rogue 
judges. It has long been part of the theory of the common law itself. Burke’s 
predecessors—primarily the great English jurists Edward Coke and Matthew Hale, 
fathers of what has been called the “classical” theory of the common law—wrote 
pointedly about the role of reason in common-law adjudication. “Reason,” Coke 
famously quipped, “is the life of the law.” The use of reason to examine and evaluate the 
prevailing legal rule has occasioned many of the remarkable moments of creativity in the 
history of the common law. In this sense, it is reason that gives life to the “living” 
Constitution, since it is reason that enables the common law to change. 
To put a label on this contrast, we might say that Strauss’s account of the common 
law is “empiricist” whereas mine is “rationalist.” Using those labels, my thesis is that a 
rationalist account of the common law is superior to an empiricist one but much less 
attractive to Strauss’s target audience, who would, all things considered, prefer Mr. 
Edmund Burke. In Section I of what follows, I present the central claims of Strauss’s 
book, paying special attention to those relevant to my thesis. Section II examines the 
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development of First Amendment protections of subversive advocacy and defends the 
rationalist account of the common law. 
 
I. ORIGINALISM, THE COMMON LAW, AND CHANGE 
There are three central claims in The Living Constitution. The first claim is that 
originalism is an unworkable and undesirable account of how courts ought to decide the 
cases before them. According to Strauss, judges cannot actually abide by the commands 
of originalism, and even if they could, we would not like the results. The second claim is 
that in contrast, the common-law process provides a workable and desirable method for 
resolving constitutional controversies. Judges can follow common-law methods—indeed, 
they have been doing so for hundreds of years—and the results are largely desirable. 
Fundamental liberties regarded as essential to modern society, such as equal-protection 
prohibitions against discrimination by the government, are products of the common-law 
process. Finally, the third claim is that common-law constitutionalism does not imply that 
the written Constitution is superfluous, as Strauss’s critics might suggest. The written 
Constitution creates a kind of “common ground” for settling disputes. Where its language 
leaves a range of alternatives open, it is the common-law process—not the formal 
amendment process—that gives our constitutional law determinate content. 
Above all this and of importance in evaluating the three central claims is the 
theme of change. Change, says Strauss, creates a kind of false puzzle or paradox about 
the Constitution. Since the time the written Constitution was adopted more than two 
6 
hundred years ago, the world has changed “in incalculable ways.”4 The United States has 
experienced revolutions in demographics, economy, and technology. These changes have 
necessitated fundamental legal changes. Yet only a “handful” of changes have been made 
to the Constitution using the mechanisms in Article V.5 It would seem, then, that there 
must be another means of changing constitutional law—at least, if we are to justify the 
full range of today’s constitutional doctrine. But it is unclear that there could be another 
means of changing constitutional law. If constitutional law could be changed outside the 
strictures of Article V, it would seem to undercut the written Constitution’s basic 
function. The Constitution, Strauss says, is supposed to embody “our most fundamental 
principles,” which remain unchanged and provide a kind of check against the vicissitudes 
of popular government. Moreover, if constitutional law were amendable by judges in the 
exercise of their discretion, then it would begin less to resemble a body of law and look 
more like a kind of fact-finding (in which judges decide what government action is and is 
not “reasonable”).6 
The common law is the solution to the paradox. The requirements of change and 
constitutionality or principledness (to coin an unfortunate term) are both met. The 
common law can adapt to changing circumstances more readily than Article V permits; 
but it is not, Strauss insists, something “that judges (or anyone else) can simply 
                                                 
4 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 1. 
5 Id. at 34. 
6 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180–
1182 (1989). 
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manipulate to fit their own ideas.”7 This is why the common-law Constitution is a living 
Constitution. It is an honest-to-goodness body of law—in the full sense of the term—that 
serves the basic function of a constitution and adapts to the changes we experience. That 
a body of law can do both is not a simple thing to understand.8 But it is, in Strauss’s eyes, 
the distinguishing feature of the common law and its fundamental advantage over 
originalism. 
Change thus serves as a convenient measure for assessing the first two of The 
Living Constitution’s central claims: that originalism fails, and that the common law 
succeeds, in providing a workable and desirable approach to judicial decision-making. 
 
Originalism 
The criticisms of originalism in The Living Constitution are not new.9 The first chapter of 
the book, which discusses originalism, reads a bit like an old laundry list; in several 
places Strauss actually resorts to using bullet points rather than the formality of full 
paragraphs. The approach contributes to a larger confusion about what originalism 
actually is and what it is meant to do. 
The target in the chapter is what Strauss calls “the core idea of originalism.” The 
core idea of originalism, he says, “is that when we give meanings to the words of the 
                                                 
7 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 3. 
8 See Fred Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455–456 (1989) 
(reviewing MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988)). 
9 Strauss himself acknowledges this. See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 29. 
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Constitution, we should use the meanings that the people who adopted those 
constitutional provisions would have assigned.”10 Strauss presents the core idea as the 
solution to a problem affecting a primitive form of textualism. According to this version 
of textualism, interpreting the Constitution requires that one just “do what the words 
say.”11 There are cases, Strauss says, where it is possible just to do what the words of the 
Constitution say. Article II, Section 1 restricts eligibility for the office of President to 
those who “have attained the Age of thirty-five Years.” The Twentieth Amendment states 
that the “terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of 
January . . . and the terms of their successors shall then begin.” 
Primitive textualism is so primitive that it is obviously a foil. There are a number 
of provisions of the Constitution whose meaning does occasion reasonable doubt. 
Strauss’s pet example—a subject he returns to throughout The Living Constitution—is 
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The relevant text states that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” What this provision permits and what 
it forbids is not immediately obvious, in the sense that it is obvious that Article II forbids 
a thirty-three-year-old from assuming the office of President. The word “speech” 
describes a range of behavior, only some of which is reasonably understood as deserving 
of constitutional protection. The expression “freedom of speech,” says Strauss, surely 
cannot include the freedom to solicit a crime, deliberately to publish falsehoods, or to 
                                                 
10 Id. at 10. 
11 Id. at 7. 
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distribute pornography to children. But if “freedom of speech” excludes this conduct, it is 
hard to see why the text requires such a result. 
According to Strauss’s narrative, originalism is meant to fill the interpretative gap 
left open in this primitive version of textualism. The gap can be filled, says the 
originalist, by consulting the understandings of those who adopted the relevant 
constitutional provision. Those who adopted the provision had a concrete sense of what 
practices it included and to whom it applied. A stock example, which Strauss duly cites, 
is the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” 
We know, says Strauss, that when the Eighth Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill 
of Rights, no one regarded it as prohibiting the death penalty. If that is the case, then “it 
follows that the death penalty cannot ever be ‘cruel and unusual.’”12 Resort to original 
understandings thus helps us to answer the question about what punishments count as 
“cruel and unusual.” 
This is originalism as a gap-filling thesis. “Gap-filling” is not Strauss’s term, but 
it captures, I think, the significance of his narrative about textualism and originalism. The 
gap-filling thesis is obviously an interpretative one. Its focus is on the practice of 
understanding a piece of text and determining the conduct to which it refers. The thesis 
faces several well-known difficulties that principally grow out of the fact that originalism 
attempts to fill the interpretative gap by resort to history. As Strauss reminds us, the 
necessary historical inquiry “can be brutally hard.”13 There may be little known about the 
                                                 
12 Id. at 10. 
13 Id. at 19. 
10 
original understanding of the provision in question. Few statements of relevance from the 
adopters or their peers may have been preserved. What was preserved may be conflicting, 
indeterminate, or otherwise hermetic. Indeed, it is possible (and perhaps likely) that no 
single original understanding of the constitutional provision in question ever existed.14 In 
this setting, determining the original understanding is difficult, if not impossible. Judges 
are poorly suited to take on the task; most lack both the necessary expertise and the 
necessary resources (principally time) to carry out the inquiry in a responsible manner. 
Moreover, the judge must be an applied historian. It is not enough for her to 
determine the original understanding; she must apply it to the case before her to 
adjudicate the dispute. This may be difficult given the radical changes in historical 
context. To take Strauss’s example, the founders may have believed they had a right to 
keep the firearms with which they were familiar for self-defense in a society like theirs; 
but that does not imply they believed the Second Amendment protected a right to keep 
modern weapons in a society like ours.15 The original understanding must be “translated” 
to our historical context if it is to help close the interpretative gap left open by the text 
alone.16 This is not a trivial task. 
These are the primary problems affecting the gap-filling thesis. Significantly, 
originalism is not merely a gap-filling thesis; it is also closely related to a set of ideas 
                                                 
14 See JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1997), at 8–11. 
15 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 21. 
16 See Larry Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1174–1182 (1993). 
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about the proper function of a written constitution, the rule of law, and the role of the 
courts.17 The Constitution is supposed to embody our fundamental law. It is written to 
establish its authority and to prevent any mistake about what that fundamental law is. 
Generally speaking, it is hard to understand how the adoption of fundamental law by a 
democratic authority is consistent with that law’s successive transformation by unelected 
officers whose role is to resolve specific disputes. Originalism appears sensitive to this 
concern. The “core idea” requires the court to honor the intentions of the adopting 
authority, as we might reasonably imagine both democracy and the rule of law to require. 
This is, without a doubt, part of what makes originalism so compelling to so many 
people; the theory fits naturally within a broader view about how law is made and what 
makes it authoritative. 
This is originalism as a jurisprudential thesis, not a gap-filling thesis. As it turns 
out, the bulk of The Living Constitution is actually aimed at the jurisprudential thesis. 
Strauss never cleanly separates the two ideas, and the book introduces originalism in gap-
filling terms—as the solution to a problem about interpretation. Yet the two theses are 
clearly different: the gap-filling thesis concerns whether it is possible to “close the 
interpretative gap” by resort to original understandings, while the jurisprudential thesis 
concerns whether it is desirable to do so in light of our broader commitments to 
constitutional democracy and the rule of law. Strauss is certainly aware of the 
                                                 
17 See Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 
311 (1995). These ideas also animate the apparent paradox surrounding constitutional 
change and Article V discussed above. 
12 
jurisprudential dimension to originalism. In a subsequent chapter, he connects originalism 
to an early version of legal positivism known as the “command theory”—the view that 
law is essentially a command from the sovereign—and argues that two form a natural 
pair.18 If law is a command from the sovereign, Strauss says, then to interpret the law, 
one should do what one normally does when interpreting a command: examine the 
evidence of what the issuer meant by the command. This points to original 
understandings. 
It should be noted that in leaving the matter at this, Strauss forgoes the resources 
of Hartian legal positivism, which may in fact support common-law constitutionalism.19 
Hart rejects the view that law is simply “a command from the sovereign,” and in its place 
develops the idea of “primary” and “secondary” social rules governing human conduct.20 
Of importance here are the secondary rules—including the famous “Rule of 
Recognition”—which, according to Hart, indicate when a social rule is law, how law can 
be changed, and who determines whether a law has been broken.21 Hart argues that these 
                                                 
18 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 36–37. The “command theory” is associated with the legal 
positivism of John Austin. 
19 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional Adjudication, 
Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 52–54 (Matthew Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
20 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 
1994), at 79–81. 
21 Id. at 94–99. 
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secondary rules ultimately consist in “social facts,” in the sense that they are equivalent 
to shared practices of regarding certain rules as authoritative.22 Now, it seems right to say 
that our own society has a shared official practice of regarding judicial precedent as 
authoritative. In Hart’s terms, we have a “secondary rule” that judicial precedent is law 
and that, in some circumstances, it is constitutional law and enjoys a concomitant degree 
of authority.23 If this is correct, then the Hartian legal positivist would seem compelled to 
acknowledge that there is a “living” body of constitutional law, just as Strauss maintains. 
Strangely, Strauss himself does not make this argument—perhaps because he thinks of 
originalism primarily in gap-filling terms. 
Strauss’s principal argument against the jurisprudential thesis and the core claim 
of the book is that originalism requires us to give up too much.24 The “originalist’s 
America,” Strauss observes, is one in which: (1) the states and the federal government 
may racially segregate public schools; (2) the government may discriminate against 
women; (3) the federal government may discriminate against the protected classes; (4) 
the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states; and (5) vast portions of federal law 
governing labor, the environment, and consumer protections exceed Congress’s power. 
Central First Amendment protections would also not exist. In each of these crucial areas, 
                                                 
22 See id. at 110. 
23 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 52–54. 
24 See also Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 231–234 (1980); Tom Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 703, 710–714 (1974). 
14 
the law depends on a landmark case or line of cases that the originalist must reject, 
including not only Brown v. Board of Education,25 but Frontiero v. Richardson26 and its 
progeny, Bolling v. Sharpe,27 Wickard v. Filburn,28 Gitlow v. New York29 and the family 
of incorporation cases, and Brandenburg v. Ohio.30 The originalist, it turns out, must do 
without wide swaths of our current law, which are largely inconsistent with what is 
known about original understandings. 
The example of racial segregation is especially painful for the originalist. As 
Strauss observes of Brown, “it is clear that when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted, it was not understood to forbid racial segregation in public schools. At that time, 
even northern states segregated their schools, if they did not simply exclude African-
American children outright.”31 It would seem to follow, then, that the originalist must 
reject Brown. But Brown is regarded as a good decision, and today its holding is almost 
certainly nonnegotiable; society has changed too deeply to contemplate a return to 
express racial segregation in the public schools. Similar things could be said for other 
constitutional protections that the originalist must jettison. 
                                                 
25 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
27 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
28 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
29 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
30 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
31 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 12. 
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What, then, of Strauss’s alternative? It is clear that if the living Constitution is to 
succeed where originalism fails, the theory must be able to explain why our core 
constitutional protections are legitimate. As it turns out, this depends on the account of 
the common law embedded within it. 
 
The Common Law 
The common law, says Strauss, “is a system [of law] built not on an authoritative, 
foundational, quasi-sacred text . . . [but] out of precedents and traditions that accumulate 
over time.”32 Its method, as Strauss describes it, is essentially the familiar process of 
argument by analogy: identifying prior cases of relevance, determining their holdings, 
applying those holdings to the instant case, and employing judgments of fairness and best 
policy where some aspect of the outcome remains in question.33 It should be noted that 
there is a considerable body of literature about “argument by analogy,” some of which 
challenges the idea that it is a sui generis form of logical inference.34 Strauss skips over 
the issue entirely. As he sees it, the common-law process should not be understood as 
“algorithmic” but as resting on judicial “attitudes” of humility about the power of 
                                                 
32 Id. at 3. 
33 Id. at 38. 
34 See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, LEGAL RULES AND LEGAL REASONING (2000), at 211–
226; Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational 
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 934–936 (1996). 
16 
individual reason and a preference for following what has worked in practice. It is these 
attitudes that form the basis of Strauss’s account of the common law. 
The judicial attitudes emerge out of a story Strauss tells about the origin and 
validity of the common law. The common law is an “ancient” system, he says (a point 
Strauss seems especially fond of), that has “deep roots, medieval roots, according to some 
accounts.”35 The judges and lawyers of this early period regarded the common law as a 
kind of custom. This meant that common-law rules did not originate as commands from 
the sovereign, as (early) legal positivism conceived of law. Common-law rules originated 
“in the way that customs often emerge in a society”: by developing over time and with no 
specific origin.36 The point about origin is connected to a second point about authority. If 
law is a command from the sovereign, then the authority of a law would seem to depend 
on the authority of the sovereign to issue the command. But, as Strauss points out, this 
way of conceptualizing authority makes little sense when applied to custom. Customs 
have authority even though the sovereign has not commanded them. 
Strauss acknowledges, as he must, that the common law is no longer regarded as a 
kind of custom. He attributes the change to a rise in the complexity of law. “Legal 
systems are now too complex and esoteric,” he says, “to be regarded as society-wide 
customs.”37 The explanation is somewhat unsatisfying; complexity has long been an 
outstanding feature of the common law (just ask anyone forced to study the Rule Against 
                                                 
35 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 3, 37. 
36 Id. at 37. 
37 Id. 
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Perpetuities).38 Nor it is clear why customary law should have to be simple, as Strauss 
evidently believes. In any case, Strauss does conclude that the common law retains 
features of customary law, even if it is not itself a kind of custom. Chiefly, the common 
law relies on precedent. Precedent, like custom, is evolutionary; it develops slowly over 
time. 
The point about evolution is a key one for Strauss. Recall that custom not only 
explains the origin of the common law but its authority as well. Strauss looks to the 
evolutionary character of the modern common law to replace the classical account of 
authority. The story he tells has elsewhere been referred to as the “wisdom of the ages” 
view of the common law.39 “Legal rules that have been worked out over an extended 
period,” Strauss says, “can claim obedience for that reason alone.”40 Why? A rule 
acceptable to successive generations is likely to work going forward. It has survived the 
test of time. It likely rests on something like common sense or a shared experience of 
what works. In Strauss’s mind, this explains the distinctive “attitude” of common-law 
judges to seek out what has worked in practice. Common-law rules are evidence of what 
has worked in practice and for that reason can serve as an authoritative basis for legal 
decision-making. 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction, in 4 
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 459–460, 498 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (1811). 
39 GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1989), at 63–65. 
40 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 38. 
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A corollary to the emphasis on experience is a distrust in abstraction and the 
power of individual human reason. Here Strauss’s inheritance from Burke becomes 
apparent. In Burke’s judgment, the wisdom of any particular individual cannot compare 
favorably with that of many individuals over time. This means that when faced with a 
choice about how to proceed, we should be disposed to follow extant, time-tested 
practices. Strauss quotes Burke’s famous remark in Reflections on the Revolution in 
France that “[w]e are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own stock of reason, 
because we suspect this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do 
better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations.”41 As it happens, 
Burke was not engaged in a defense of the common law when he made this remark; he 
was defending traditional social and political arrangements he perceived to be under 
attack in revolutionary France. But Strauss sees the same view of individual human 
reason in the common-law judge’s devotion to precedent. The common-law judge, says 
Strauss, is modest about his own capacity for reason and the capacities of the lawyers 
before him, preferring to follow what has been time-tested. “It is an act of intellectual 
hubris,” Strauss says, describing the view of the common-law judge, “to think you know 
better than that accumulated wisdom [in precedent].”42 Thus, even if precedent cannot be 
justified “in theoretical abstractions,” its history is evidence of its value. 
                                                 
41 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 3 THE WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 346 (2008). The quotation appears on page 41 of STRAUSS, 
supra note 1. 
42 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 41. 
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Together, the attitudes of distrust in reason and a preference for what has worked 
in practice make up Strauss’s “empiricist” account of the common law. So described, 
Strauss believes that the common law is preferable to originalism on a number of fronts. 
It is, he argues, “more workable” than originalism, since it does not require judges to be 
historians. The common law requires judges to analyze precedent and to make basic 
judgments about fairness and social policy, which they have been doing for hundreds of 
years. (Whether they have been doing so in cases involving constitutional law is less 
clear.)43 The common law is also “more justifiable” than originalism. It does not run into 
what Strauss calls “Jefferson’s Problem” (a familiar problem apparently given a political 
rebranding), which is a puzzle about why the law of prior generations ought to bind the 
present generation.44 The common law answers Jefferson’s Problem by its reliance on 
judicial precedent, which is justifiable for having stood the test of time.45 
But most important, argues Strauss, is that the empiricist account of the common 
law succeeds where originalism primarily failed: in accounting for our core constitutional 
protections. Strauss defends this claim by exploring the protection of political speech 
under the First Amendment and the prohibition against racial segregation in public 
schools under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Next, I consider whether Strauss’s 
argument about the First Amendment succeeds. 
                                                 
43 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Myth of the Common Law Constitution, in COMMON 
LAW THEORY 207–229 (Douglas Edlin ed., 2007). 
44 “Jefferson’s Problem” is usually referred to as the problem of the dead hand. 
45 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 43–44. 
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II. THE COMMON LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The problem the First Amendment poses for originalism is well known. “To put the point 
bluntly but accurately,” Strauss writes, “the text and the original understandings of the 
First Amendment are essentially irrelevant to the American system of freedom of 
expression as it exists today.”46 This system of freedom of expression enjoys broad 
support. Unlike protections rooted in Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, there is at 
present little disagreement across the political spectrum that much of First Amendment 
doctrine is good law.47 This obviously raises the cost of failing to explain its 
development. The originalist cannot shrug his shoulders when it comes to political 
speech; he must show why it is rightly protected. 
To that end, there have been assertions that the system of freedom of expression is 
actually rooted in the original understanding of the First Amendment. Strauss cites the 
example of Zechariah Chafee, the influential First Amendment scholar of the early 
twentieth century, who casually characterized the Supreme Court’s decision in Schenck 
v. United States as being “in accord with the purposes of the framers of the 
Constitution.”48 Justice Brandeis made similar remarks in his concurrence in Whitney v. 
California, where he wrote at length about the speech-protective beliefs of “[t]hose who 
                                                 
46 Id. at 55. 
47 The recent uproar over the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), is an important exception. 
48 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), at 82. 
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won our independence by revolution.”49 Yet the evidence of what the adopters of the 
First Amendment understood is at best unclear. 
One of the chief problems is reflected in the text of the amendment itself, which 
refers only to Congress. As Strauss points out, a narrow interpretation of this language 
would fit naturally with the adopters’ known concerns about balancing power between 
federal and state governments. But the larger difficulty, of course, is making sense of the 
English tradition of punishing seditious libel, which arguably continued in the United 
States with Congress’s enactment of the Sedition Act in 1798 as well as similar state 
laws. The meaning of the Sedition Act and whether it accorded with the original 
understanding of the First Amendment have been heavily disputed. Yet it was hardly 
Congress’s only effort to punish seditious libel. As we will see, Congress criminalized 
much the same activity 120 years later in the Espionage Act of 1918.50 There can be 
“little doubt,” Strauss says, that early Americans would have permitted forms of 
censorship that we now consider incompatible with the First Amendment.51 
Strauss thus sets out to tell a common-law story about the evolution of the First 
Amendment principles protecting speech. He identifies three such principles: (1) the 
protection of the right to criticize the government and advocate radical reform 
(sometimes called “subversive advocacy”); (2) the distinction between so-called high-
value speech and low-value speech, such as incitement, obscenity, defamation, and 
                                                 
49 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
50 HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 139 (1988). 
51 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 61. 
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commercial speech; and (3) the distinction between content-based speech restrictions, 
content-neutral speech restrictions, and incidental restrictions of speech.52 These 
principles were developed largely in the last hundred years by the Supreme Court. 
According to Strauss, they developed according to a common-law process, which was 
evolutionary, was based on precedent, and, he says, exhibited “an unmistakable concern 
with what kinds of First Amendment principles would make sense and achieve good 
results.”53 This, of course, is the empiricist account of the common law. 
 
Subversive Advocacy 
If we isolate the first principle—the protection of the right to criticize the government—
then the story begins with World War I. Strauss focuses on Justice Holmes’s opinion for 
the Court in Schenck v. United States.54 Schenck involved a prosecution under the 1917 
Espionage Act, which criminalized a wide variety of activity judged subversive of the 
war effort, including willfully causing or attempting to cause “insubordination, 
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty” and willfully obstructing recruitment or enlistment 
in the armed services.55 Mr. Schenck was a Socialist Party official. He had participated in 
the distribution of a leaflet that urged conscripts to join the Socialist Party “in its 
campaign for the repeal of the Conscription Act” and to recognize their right to resist the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 53–55. 
53 Id. at 62. 
54 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
55 40 Stat. 217 (1917). 
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draft.56 As one scholar has pointed out, the leaflet was “[b]y modern standards . . . 
startlingly mild.”57 Nevertheless, Schenck was convicted and sentenced to six months in 
prison for violating the Espionage Act. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Holmes reasoned that Congress had the power to prevent efforts to interfere with military 
recruitment, even if those efforts were carried out using words. While the particular 
words Schenck used might have been constitutionally protected in a time of peace, they 
could not be protected, said Holmes, in a time of war, given the “hindrance” they 
threatened to create for the war effort. The scope of constitutional protection was thus 
context-dependent. As Holmes put it, “The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.”58 
Despite Holmes’s language, most indications were that the Supreme Court did not 
develop a new “clear and present danger” test in Schenck. The phrase itself was novel; as 
Strauss points out, it did not come from the text of the Constitution or the “original 
understanding” of the First Amendment. Nor did the Schenck Court offer an extended 
analysis of the phrase, as one might suppose. It was difficult to see what conduct such a 
test would have protected, given the mild language of the leaflets at issue. Significantly, 
                                                 
56 See KALVEN, supra note 44, at 131. 
57 Id. 
58 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
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the Court omitted the words entirely from its opinion in an Espionage Act case decided 
one week later, Debs v. United States, which involved the prosecution of a politician who 
had publicly praised individuals resisting the draft.59 The politician, Eugene Debs, was a 
major figure in America at the time; he had run for President on multiple occasions and 
received hundreds of thousands of votes. His conviction and sentencing to a ten-year 
prison term for making a political speech was, as Harry Kalven has rightly pointed out, 
“so alien to American expectations that it clamor[ed] for a close look by the Court.”60 Yet 
Holmes again wrote an opinion for the Court affirming the conviction and failing even to 
mention “clear and present danger.” A companion case, Frohwerk v. United States, also 
omitted the phrase and also affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.61 
What followed Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk was, by every measure, a startling 
act of revisionist history by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Abrams v. United States, 
decided later in 1919, was a prosecution under the 1918 Espionage Act.62 The 1918 Act 
amended the 1917 Act to add penalties for publishing “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive 
language about the form of Government of the United States,” or language “intended to 
                                                 
59 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
60 KALVEN, supra note 44, at 135. 
61 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). Both opinions do contain notions akin 
to “proximate cause,” which Justice Holmes may have understood to be equivalent to 
“clear and present danger.” See KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW (2d ed. 
2003), at 23. 
62 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
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bring the form of Government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely and 
disrepute”—offenses which were classic examples of seditious libel. Abrams himself was 
a Russian immigrant who had published leaflets criticizing the United States for its 
military involvement in Russia after the revolution and calling for a strike of workers at 
munitions and defense factories. The leaflets contained language typical of the utopian 
revolutionaries of the time (“Workers of the World! Rise!”), but Abrams’s cause was a 
decidedly minority one; he distributed some of the leaflets by dropping them out his 
apartment window in New York City.63 
Unsurprisingly, the majority of the Court affirmed Abrams’s conviction under the 
1918 Act and offered in defense of its ruling a reading of the leaflet’s incendiary rhetoric, 
designed to show that Abrams in fact intended to interfere with the United States’ war 
effort and to criticize its form of government.64 In what must have seemed an 
inexplicable move to his associates, Justice Holmes dissented. As others have noted, the 
dissent he authored is highly uneven in quality; it comprises in large part a rambling 
discussion of the government’s failure to prove intent.65 Near the end of the dissent—
almost as an afterthought—Holmes turns abruptly to the language from Schenck (altering 
it slightly to “clear and imminent danger”). One has the unmistakable sense that Holmes 
is grasping for something. Yet it is difficult to see what use the orphaned phrase could be, 
given the affirmance in Schenck and the Debs and Frohwerk decisions. Despite all this, 
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what makes Abrams the first great Supreme Court decision on subversive advocacy is 
what Holmes does to give the expression content. He offers what Zechariah Chafee later 
called a “magnificent exposition of the philosophic basis of this article of our 
Constitution.”66 Here is Holmes, whose eloquence is worth quoting at length: 
<EXT> 
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power, and want a certain 
result with all your heart, you naturally express your wishes in law, and 
sweep away all opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely 
can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is 
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, 
we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system, I think that we 
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they 
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
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pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country.67 
</EXT> 
Nothing in this passage draws on or is responsive to the Supreme Court’s earlier 
decisions on subversive advocacy and the First Amendment. Indeed, Holmes’s 
“philosophic” exposition of what he calls the “theory of our Constitution” can only fairly 
be regarded as a startling departure from the Court’s previous decisions under the 
Espionage Acts. Nothing in those decisions betrays Holmes’s apparent belief that the 
First Amendment was designed to promote truth by encouraging free exchange in a 
marketplace of ideas. 
If there is a predecessor for the Abrams dissent, it was the decision in Masses 
Publishing Co. v. Patten, decided two years before Schenck and in a different court.68 
Strangely, Strauss skips over Masses entirely. The case was another prosecution under 
the 1917 Espionage Act. The plaintiffs published a Socialist political magazine called, 
naturally, “The Masses.” Regulations promulgated under the 1917 Act empowered the 
Postmaster General to refuse to deliver materials he judged to be in violation of the law. 
On instruction from the Postmaster General, New York Postmaster Patten advised the 
plaintiffs that he would not permit their magazine to be mailed, and the plaintiffs sought 
an injunction preventing this. Judge Learned Hand granted the injunction. As his opinion 
shows, what Hand understood—and what Holmes apparently did not until Abrams—was 
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that the government’s decision to suppress political dissent could not be analyzed like 
run-of-the-mill incitement or solicitation of a crime.69 Space had to be created for 
political agitation, which had a special value to free government. As Hand put it, “to 
assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to 
disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in normal times is a 
safeguard of free government.”70 
To be sure, Hand’s attempt to locate the relevant distinction differed from 
Holmes; Hand focused on the language used, while Holmes focused on the context in 
which the language was used. Yet what Hand did in Masses was to show why radical 
criticism of the government should be distinguished from pure incitement. This was the 
key insight from which the First Amendment’s rules against the punishment of seditious 
libel emerged. 
Still, Justice Holmes’s opinion in Abrams was a dissent, and the real story of the 
development of the law in this area concerns how the opinion moved from a minority 
view to a majority view. Strauss, of course, is keen to emphasize this development. Yet 
his description feels oddly hollow; Holmes’s approach, he says, was gradually adopted 
because it “had broad cultural resonance and, ultimately, it seemed to work well.”71 
While the approach certainly came to have broad cultural resonance, it is not clear that it 
did in 1919, and Strauss cites no support for such a view. Moreover, it is unclear what 
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Strauss could mean by the suggestion that “Holmes’s approach . . . seemed to work well.” 
What worked well? The idea that there should be a marketplace of ideas? The “clear and 
present danger” test? Specifically, how did these ideas work well? What confirmed their 
effectiveness? There is nothing in the chapter to tell us the answer to these questions, and 
this is because they are largely misplaced. Just as the story of Masses and Abrams is not 
the story of the Court making a modest adjustment to established precedent, the story of 
what followed Abrams is not a story about the empirical verification that the Court’s 
approach “seemed to work well.” It is, at least in the early stages, a story about two 
brilliant justices whose stature and argumentative force worked a change in the law—
despite being consistently in the minority. 
The tactic taken by Justices Holmes and Brandeis was a brash one. It was to 
insist, although the Court knew otherwise, that “clear and present danger” was the First 
Amendment test, and that the content of this test was described not by the actual holdings 
of the relevant cases (Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, and Abrams, which were hostile to 
speech) but by the justices’ own theoretical perorations on the value of free speech and its 
vital role in political society. The merit of such arguments could not have been measured 
by whether they “worked”—they were not even law—but was confined to ordinary 
judgments about the value of protecting speech in the midst of the vast social changes 
and political instability of the times. 
The formative exchange in this evolution occurred between Justices Sanford and 
Brandeis. Gitlow v. New York, decided in 1925, concerned the conviction of a political 
leader under New York’s criminal syndicalism statute, which prohibited advocating the 
30 
violent overthrow of the government.72 Benjamin Gitlow had participated in printing a 
pamphlet, the Left Wing Manifesto, that indeed advocated overthrow through “mass 
political strikes and revolutionary mass action.”73 Like the pamphleteers of World War I, 
Gitlow filled the Left Wing Manifesto with turgid revolutionary prose that generally 
advocated strikes and other forms of collective resistance but did not call for any specific 
acts. The Court nonetheless affirmed his conviction. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Sanford argued that the legislature’s decision to criminalize such a category of speech 
could only be subject to rational-basis review. He reasoned: 
<EXT> 
[T]he immediate danger [from advocacy of overthrow] is none the less 
real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be 
accurately foreseen. The State cannot reasonably be required to measure 
the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler’s 
scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a 
time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be 
said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the 
exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public 
peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it 
has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration.74 
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</EXT> 
At least where a statute expressly criminalized speech, Justice Sanford would permit the 
legislature to prohibit pamphlets like Gitlow’s, which only generally advocated 
overthrow. The danger that such advocacy could cause disorder was real, and the 
legislature had to be permitted to address it preemptively.75 
Sanford’s reasoning captured the majority of the Court in the cases that followed 
Gitlow. But in Whitney v. California, decided two years later, Justice Brandeis offered a 
direct rejoinder that eventually gained the upper hand.76 Whitney involved another 
conviction of a political figure under a state criminal syndicalism statute. In this case, the 
target was Anita Whitney, a well-known society figure and advocate for the poor. After 
Whitney attended a convention of the California Communist Labor Party, she was tried 
and convicted for joining an organization that advocated forceful overthrow of the 
government.77 The Court again affirmed the conviction. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Sanford repeated his argument that the state legislature could, within the limits of due 
process, “punish those who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the 
                                                 
75 Holmes dissented from the Court’s opinion and, as he had done in Abrams, cited the 
“clear and present danger” language from Schenck. Id. at 672–673. Justice Sanford 
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77 Id. at 363–366. 
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public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the 
foundations of organized government.”78 
Justice Brandeis concurred in the result, but used his opinion to rebut the 
majority. Citing the language of “clear and present danger” from Schenck, Brandeis 
argued that permitting the legislature to silence political criticism preemptively would 
actually interfere with the mechanisms by which a free society digested political 
criticism.79 The actual effect of syndicalism statutes was thus not to prevent 
“conflagration,” as Sanford had imagined, but to “breed repression [and] hate,” which 
ultimately would “menace[] stable government.”80 What the “clear and present danger” 
test meant, said Brandeis, was that “fear of serious injury alone cannot justify suppression 
of free speech.” Only a serious emergency would qualify. Brandeis then remarked: 
<EXT> 
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They 
did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. 
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and 
fearless reasoning applied through the process of popular government, no 
danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the 
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incidence of evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion.81 
</EXT> 
I quote these passages at length not simply because they are some of the most 
remarkable and beautiful writing produced by the Supreme Court. What the passages 
show is that subversive-advocacy doctrine was not formed in a Burkean fashion, by 
making modest adjustment to precedents whose efficacy had been demonstrated over 
time. Rather, the decisions of the 1910s and 1920s evidence a kind of sustained 
theoretical argument about the value of free speech by judges who did not have time-
tested precedent to cite. Instead, the arguments were injected into what was essentially a 
throwaway phrase in Schenck: “clear and present danger.” Yet by the late 1930s, the 
arguments had garnered a majority.82 In the 1943 case of West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, which dealt with the issue of compelled speech, the Court was 
comfortable enough to describe the “clear and present danger” standard as 
“commonplace” and to suggest that it required “immediate and urgent grounds” for 
suppression, just as Brandeis had recommended in his Whitney concurrence.83 
This is the sense in which the empiricist account of the common law is too weak 
to explain the legal developments that lead to our First Amendment protections of 
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subversive advocacy. While Strauss is surely correct that the process was “evolutionary” 
and had little to do with the constitutional text or the original understandings, his 
suggestion that the developments were based largely on the Court’s own precedent and a 
concern with “what worked in practice” does not seem accurate. What is distinctive about 
this moment in our constitutional history is precisely the opposite: that it was based 
largely on ambitious theoretical arguments about the value of protecting free speech that 
were repeated in dissent by a handful of judges. This is the process we have to thank for 
our First Amendment right to criticize the government.84 
 
The Rationalist Common Law 
If an empiricist account of the common law cannot fully explain the development of our 
constitutional protections of subversive advocacy, what account of the common law can? 
Or can no account of the common law explain these developments? 
A rationalist account of the common law begins by rejecting the Burkean distrust 
of reason. Instead, the rationalist account draws on an older tradition of thinking about 
                                                 
84 I do not mean to imply that the 1940s were the end of the development of subversive-
advocacy law. This, of course, is not true. The Brandenburg decision was still some thirty 
years off when Barnette was handed down, and the World War II period saw another 
wave of suppression-friendly cases in the high court. See Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951). Yet, just as Strauss notes, Brandenburg rejected this regression, and 
using different language, sought to recapture the principles articulated by Holmes and 
Brandeis. 
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the common law, associated with several prominent English common-law jurists who 
preceded Burke: Edward Coke and Matthew Hale. This tradition, which has been called 
the “classical” account of the common law, can be read to emphasize the role of reason in 
common-law adjudication.85 Indeed, the classical account gave a special name to the 
reason employed by lawyers and judges in adjudication—“artificial reason”—to 
distinguish it from the natural capacity to reason with which each individual was born 
(“natural reason”).86 One acquired artificial reason by long and painstaking study of the 
common law, which revealed how the community went about resolving disputes. 
Artificial reason was then used in the course of adjudication to identify, evaluate, and 
apply the rule of law.87 
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In short, the classical account of the common law emphasized that adjudication 
involved public deliberation about the law and how it should be applied to the case at 
hand. It should be noted that this collective process differs from the individual exercise of 
reason that Burke so distrusted. While Burke may have been right to suspect that the 
“stock of reason . . . in each man is small,” the classical jurists did not regard common-
law adjudication as involving individuals working in isolation from each other. As they 
understood it, adjudication was a collective process of deliberation between the judge and 
the parties, represented by their lawyers. This process of collective reasoning naturally 
checks and corrects individual reason. Indeed, the collective nature of common-law 
adjudication was part of the reason classical jurists were at pains to distinguish “artificial 
reason” from the individual capacity of “natural reason.”88 
The rationalist account of the common law parts ways from the classical account 
in rejecting the idea that the common law is a kind of custom. The common law is judge-
made law. It is not, as the classical jurists argued, “discovered” by judges in examination 
of our shared customs.89 Yet this is not a reason to reject the authority of the common 
law. A common-law rule shown reasonable in the process of adjudication has a natural 
claim of authority over those before the court. The parties have an opportunity to offer 
their views of what the law is and how it ought to apply to their case. Where the result 
reached by the court joins their arguments, it provide the parties a basis for regarding the 
result as being reasonable, fair, and appropriate. This contrasts with the empiricist 
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account of the common law’s authority, which rested on the fact that precedent is subject 
to the test of time.90 On the rationalist account, the common law is authoritative because 
it is subject to the test of public deliberation. 
The developments in First Amendment law sketched above show plain traces of 
the rationalist common law at work. As we saw, the development of a speech-protective 
“clear and present danger” test was driven by the ambitious theoretical arguments of 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Their arguments were offered as a basis for rejecting the 
approach taken in Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, and Abrams, which largely permitted 
punishment of wartime “seditious libel.” During the 1910s and the 1920s, these 
arguments were confined to dissents. They inspired countertheories from Justice Sanford 
in Gitlow and afterwards. But as the arguments of Holmes and Brandeis percolated 
through the Court and through larger political society, they began to gain traction. This 
was not a process of empirical verification. There was nothing to verify or disconfirm. It 
was a process, at least in part, of public deliberation in which the Court engaged in an 
open dispute over the merit of protecting radical criticism of government, which was 
quite prevalent at the time. By the time of De Jonge v. Oregon and Barnette, the 
deliberation had concluded in favor of Holmes and Brandeis. 
The rationalist account also illuminates an important theme in The Living 
Constitution that I discussed at the beginning of the review. To recall, Strauss introduced 
the common law as the solution to a false paradox about change and constitutional law. 
The paradox was that the pace of social change seemed to require the Constitution to be 
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amendable in ways other than those permitted by Article V. Yet the possibility of making 
such changes to the Constitution threatened to undermine its status and the broader rule 
of law. Now we can see, I believe, how common-law changes to the Constitution do not 
undermine its status as fundamental law. When change occurs as the result of a process of 
public deliberation like the one described above, it is change by law. The change is not 
made on an arbitrary basis according to the fiat of those in power but proceeds from a 
principled extension of our existing legal framework. In the case of subversive advocacy, 
the principles in question concerned the necessity of permitting radical criticism in a free 
society with a popular government. Our form of government requires such criticism, and 
it is for that reason that the First Amendment should distinguish it from workaday 
incitement to a crime.91 
Arguably, the written Constitution was drafted in a way to encourage this kind of 
legal change. I discuss above the distinction between those provisions of the Constitution 
whose meaning is obvious and those whose meaning is not obvious. Strauss argues that 
the latter provisions create a difficulty for textualism. Yet there is a deeper point to be 
made about this distinction and the rationalist common law. The provisions whose 
meaning is obvious are largely those for which public deliberation brings little value; 
disputing when the term of one Congress should end and the next begin could only invite 
a breakdown in the peaceful transfer of power. The same cannot be said for the 
provisions whose meaning is not obvious. Public deliberation over the meaning of, for 
                                                 
91 See Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847, 850–860 
(1987). 
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example, the Free Speech Clause has direct value for our constitutional democracy.92 The 
language of these provisions thus encourages deliberation over the basic structure of 
political society. This deliberation is the engine of legal change. 
Judges play a leading role in this process but they are not the only actors. The 
suggestion is not that those who adopted the written Constitution intended, by approval of 
its abstract language, to bestow on judges the privilege of determining our fundamental 
law. Abstract language does not entail so-called judicial “supremacy.” The suggestion is, 
however, that the Constitution’s adopters intended to provide judges a role in this 
process; given the adopters’ familiarity with the English common law, they could have 
scarcely imagined a different result.93 The rationalist common law provides a sensible 
account of what that role is. It draws on the institutional strengths of the court and of the 
judicial office. And it admits of articulable limits and a fair balance with the other 
institutions of government and the people themselves. There is much to say about the 
details of this role, but it comes, in short, to this: that good judges shape the law in 
response to the concerns articulated by the parties before the court, whose arguments in 
                                                 
92 Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 112; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 2 (1997) 
(describing the “moral reading” of the Constitution). 
93 The attitude toward judicial review (i.e., judicial “nullification” of an unconstitutional 
law) in the 1780s appears to have been mixed, but there is no question that the founding 
generation was familiar with the judicial role in developing common-law precedent. See 
LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 52 (2004). 
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turn call to attention the concerns of the broader public.94 In the constitutional setting, the 
judge connects these concerns to constitutional principles, thereby giving the principles 
determinate content and contributing to the development of constitutional law. All of this 
is carried out in public under procedural norms that require an exchange of reasons and a 
justification for the end result. This puts the court in the service of the people in carrying 
out the task of self-government.95 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Living Constitution is an important book. Its account of the common law offers a 
viable alternative to originalism. Yet in an apparent effort to make the common law 
palatable to a wide audience, Strauss hobbles it. Judges have an active and creative role 
to play in common-law adjudication. Part of that role involves evaluating and shaping the 
law as it is applied to new circumstances, sometimes in accordance with theoretical 
argument. By attempting to avoid this result, Strauss leaves his theory unable to account 
for our core constitutional protections, as he claims—principally, First Amendment 
protections of subversive advocacy. The lesson is that we cannot build protection from 
judicial “activism” into the common-law process. The proper way to address such a 
concern is to choose our judges with care. 
                                                 
94 See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5 (1949). 
95 For an exploration of this idea, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 
Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73–76 (1985). 
 
22-Jan-19] REASON AND THE COMMON LAW 41 
 
